The Soviet 1931-1933 Famines and the Ukrainian Holodomor by A. Graziosi
Sooner or later the Soviet people will put you in the dock as traitor 
to both socialism and revolution, main wrecker, true enemy of the 
people, organizer of the famine…
—F. Raskol'nikov, Soviet Ambassador to Bulgaria, to Stalin, 
17 August 19391
Between the end of 1932 and the summer of 1933, famine in the USSR killed, in 
half the time, approximately seven times as many people as the Great Terror of 
1937–1938. It was the peak of a series of famines that had started in 1931, and 
it constituted the turning point of the decade as well as Soviet prewar history’s 
main event. With its approximately five million victims (I am not including 
the hundreds of thousands, possibly more than a million, who had already died 
in Kazakhstan and elsewhere since 1931), compared to the one to two million 
victims of 1921–1922 and 1946–1947, this also was the most severe famine in 
Soviet history and an event that left its mark for decades. Its effect was felt in 
countries inhabited by immigrant communities from the Russian Empire and the 
USSR, and its importance, political as well as historical, is still strong today. Since 
1987–1988, the rediscovery and interpretation of the Famine have played a key 
role in Ukraine in discussions between supporters of the democratization process 
and those who still adhere to a procommunist ideology. The Holodomor (the word 
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coined to mean hunger-related mass extermination, implying intentionality) thus 
moved to the center of the political and cultural debate, becoming part of the 
process of state and nation building in Ukraine. 
Yet until 1986, when Robert Conquest published his Harvest of Sorrow,2 
historians had almost completely ignored this extraordinary event. This is not to 
say that there was no documentation available, as I realized when reading Italian 
diplomats’ reports to Mussolini—in fact such documents prove that it had always 
been possible to know. Thanks to the twentieth-century mass population move-
ments—migrations, forced or otherwise, displacements, etc.—and the traces that 
they left, such as diplomatic dispatches, travel accounts, memoirs of witnesses 
and victims, much was there, ready to bear witness.3
In this light it is startling to recall how little we knew before Conquest’s book 
appeared.4 In the best case, historians such as Naum Jasny and Alec Nove did 
speak of a “man-made famine” (which was still being treated as a single event) 
without, however, researching it fully and generally ignoring its national aspect. A 
few years later, Moshe Lewin analyzed the mechanisms that caused the Famine, 
but did not deal with the Famine as such.5 In the worst case, the Famine became 
the occasion for depressing polemics in which its very existence was questioned 
or minimized. In the USSR, where historians, even after 1956, could speak only 
of “food difficulties,” the use of the very word golod/holod (hunger, famine) was 
forbidden. In Ukraine it was uttered officially for the first time in December 1987, 
in First Secretary Volodymyr Shcherbyts'kyi’s speech celebrating the republic’s 
seventieth anniversary. 
That is why Conquest’s book, the outcome of the Harvard Ukrainian Research 
Institute project, has been of crucial importance: it forced a reluctant profession to 
deal with a fundamental question, and it did so by stressing the connection between 
famine and the national question while properly differentiating the Kazakh case. 
It can thus be maintained that historiography on the famines and the Holodomor 
starts with Conquest, even though other authors, such as Sergei Maksudov or 
Zhores Medvedev, were by then seriously dealing with these events.6 The book’s 
significance is even greater in light of the polemics that it raised. Because their 
level was much superior to that of previous polemics, they grew into a positive 
phenomenon, which may be viewed as part of the process through which histo-
rians finally became aware of these events’ extraordinary human and intellectual 
dimensions. This process was, and still is, especially painful because it took and is 
taking place after a historical judgment had already been made and a “collective 
memory” had set in, all without the Soviet famines entering the picture. This 
was both a consequence of the successful Soviet attempt at concealment and a 
manifestation of one of the European twentieth century’s key features—the logic 
of “taking sides” that dominated the discussion. Therefore, the famines had to, 
and today still have to, be brought into our representation of the past at the price 
of a complete restructuring of commonly held beliefs. 
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Then came the 1991 archival and historiographical revolution. It allowed the 
accumulation of new knowledge and caused a leap in the quality of polemics, 
which, with few exceptions, then grew into serious controversies. True scholarly 
spirit and a firm moral commitment, born of an awareness of the immensity 
of the tragedy they deal with, animate the two camps in which it is possible to 
group today’s existing positions at the price of some simplification and much 
schematization. One can thus contemplate these past few years, during which 
Conquest’s conclusions have been integrated and in part surpassed, with a sense 
of satisfaction and find in them some reason for optimism.
By means of yet more simplification, the positions of these two camps may be 
summed up in the following way (I am paraphrasing from a letter that a brilliant 
young Ukrainian scholar recently sent me). On one side there are what we could 
call “A” people. They support the genocide thesis and see in the Famine an event 
artificially organized in order to: (a) break the peasants and/or (b) alter (destroy) 
the Ukrainian nation’s social fabric, which obstructed the transformation of the 
USSR into a despotic empire. On the other side we have “B” people, who, though 
fully recognizing the criminal nature of Stalin’s policies, deem it necessary to 
study the Famine as a “complex phenomenon,” in which many factors, from 
the geopolitical situation to the modernization effort, played a role in Moscow’s 
intentions and decisions. 
I believe that today we have most of the elements needed for a new, and more 
satisfactory, interpretive hypothesis, capable of taking into account both the 
general and complex Soviet picture and the undeniable relevance of the national 
question.7 This hypothesis can be put together using the excellent works of Ukrai-
nian, Russian, and Western scholars as building blocks, thus breaking the wall that 
still partially separates their efforts. It is grounded in the research of outstanding 
scholars such as Viktor Danilov, R. W. Davies and Stephen Wheatcroft, N. A. 
Ivnitskii, D’Ann Penner and Viktor Kondrashin, Stanislav Kul'chyts'kyi, James 
Mace, Terry Martin, France Meslé and Jacques Vallin, Iurii Shapoval and Valerii 
Vasyl'iev, and also Oleg Khlevniuk, whose works on Stalin and his circle, though 
not focusing directly on the Famine, allowed us to situate it in its proper political 
context.8 
In the next pages I will try to sketch the outline of such an interpretation. I hope 
not only to push forward the interpretation of the “Great Famine” (a collective 
name for the 1931–1933 famines), but also to stimulate a debate that will contrib-
ute to the breaking of the even taller and stronger wall that isolates its students 
from their colleagues studying the European twentieth century, a century that is 
simply impossible to fully understand without considering those famines.
In order to formulate this new interpretation, we need first to define the object 
of our investigation. As should be clear by now, we are in fact dealing with 
what it would be more correct to call, on a pan-Soviet level, the 1931–1933 
famines, which had of course common causes and a common background, but 
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included at least two very different and special phenomena: the Kazakhstan 
famine-cum- epidemics of 1931–1933 and the Ukrainian-Kuban (the latter area, 
though belonging to the Russian republic’s province of Northern Caucasus, being 
mostly inhabited by Ukrainians) Holodomor of late 1932 to early 1933. 
Many past misunderstandings have been caused by the confusion between these 
two national tragedies and the general phenomenon that provided their framework. 
In a way, it is as if students of Nazism would confuse Nazi repression in general 
with quite specific and crucial cases, such as the extermination of Soviet prisoners 
of war, or that of Poles and Gypsies—not to mention the Holocaust, an exceptional 
phenomenon that cannot be explained simply as an aspect or element of Nazi 
killings at large, and yet certainly was also a part of them. Both Nazi repression 
in general and such “specific” tragedies existed, and both must be studied, as in 
fact they are, in and of themselves as well as in their connections.
A very clear distinction between the general phenomenon and its republic-level 
or regional manifestations should therefore be introduced in the Soviet case. 
However, most “A” supporters are in fact speaking specifically of the Holodomor, 
while many of the “B” proponents think on a pan-Soviet scale. If we analytically 
distinguish what they are doing, we end up discovering that in many, albeit not 
all, ways they are correct in their respective domains.
The second step toward a new interpretation consists of yet another analytical 
distinction. We must separate the 1931–1932 “spontaneous” famines—they too, of 
course, were direct, if undesired, consequences of choices made in 1928–1929—
from the post–September 1932 Famine, which took on such terrible features not 
least because of human decision. (Events in Kazakhstan followed an altogether 
different pattern and I will therefore only make some passing references to them.)9 
Finally, the third step we need to take is to gather and combine useful elements 
from both “A” and “B” and drop their unsatisfactory parts. 
“A” people are right in drawing our attention to the national question. Anyone 
studying the Soviet Union should be acutely aware of its importance, as Lenin 
and Stalin themselves were (after all, the former decided not to call the new state 
Russia, and the latter, who initially opposed such a choice, never reversed the 
decision in later years). One should be equally aware of the Ukrainian primacy 
in this matter. In late 1919 Lenin started the shift towards indigenization (koreni-
zatsiia),10 until that time considered to be a request of “extreme nationalists,” 
because of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks’ defeat of 1919,11 and Stalin gave a new spin 
to korenizatsiia in late 1932 because of the Ukrainian crisis. But in Ukraine, at 
least up to 1933, the national question was the peasant question. This is what both 
Lenin and Stalin thought, and rightly so. “A” people seem instead to be wrong 
in thinking that the “Famine” (meaning also the pan-Soviet one) was organized 
(“planned”) to solve the Ukrainian national, or rather peasant, problem.
“B” people give us a detailed reconstruction of the causes and wider context 
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of the Famine on a pan-Soviet scale, with all its complexity, and are thus able 
to criticize convincingly the simplistic views of the “A” camp. However, they 
seem unable to fully understand or accommodate the national factor; that is, to 
“descend” from the pan-Soviet to the republic level. “B” people also do not always 
seem capable of seeing that Stalin, even when he did not initiate something will-
fully, was always very quick to take advantage of “spontaneous” events, giving 
them a completely new turn. The obvious parallel here is with Kirov’s murder, 
which Stalin most probably did not organize, but quite certainly “creatively” used. 
One can thus use good “B” data for the development of the pan-Soviet crisis, 
stressing however that at this level, too, Stalin at a certain moment decided to 
use hunger to break the peasants’ opposition to collectivization. For a number of 
reasons, such opposition was stronger in non-Russian areas, where events soon 
started to follow their own course. By reconstructing this course we can crack the 
secret surrounding the 1932–1933 events from their inception—a secret which, 
as Raskol'nikov’s letter seems to suggest, was known to the Bolshevik elite.
What can therefore be said? From 1931 to 1933 scores, perhaps hundreds, 
of thousands of people died of hunger throughout the USSR. In Kazakhstan, 
Ukraine, Northern Caucasus, and the Volga basin (Povolzh'e), however, the situ-
ation was completely different. But for Western Siberia, these were the country’s 
most important grain-growing regions, where the post-1927 state-village conflict 
over the crop was strongest. Since 1918–1919, moreover, the war between the 
regime and peasants and nomads there had been particularly brutal because of 
the intensifying role of national and religious factors, and in the Volga because 
of both the Russian peasant movement’s strong traditions and the presence of 
German colonists.
Except in Kazakhstan, the phenomenon’s causes were similar across these 
areas: the devastating human toll, as well as the toll on the capacity for production, 
taken by dekulakization—a de facto nationwide, state-led pogrom against the 
peasant elite; forced collectivization, which pushed peasants to destroy a large 
part of their inventories;12 the kolkhozes’ inefficiency and misery; the repeated 
and extreme requisition waves originated by a crisis-ridden industrialization, an 
urbanization out of control, and a growing foreign debt that could be repaid only 
by exporting raw materials; the resistance of peasants, who would not accept the 
reimposition of what they called a “second serfdom” and worked less and less 
because of both their rejection of the new system and hunger-related debilita-
tion; and the poor weather conditions in 1932. Famine, which had started to take 
hold sporadically already in 1931 (when Kazakhs were dying in mass), and had 
grown into solid pockets by the spring of 1932, thus appears to have been an 
undesired and unplanned outcome of ideology-inspired policies aimed at elimi-
nating mercantile and private production. Based on the results of the 1920–1921 
war communism policy, the Famine should not have been difficult to foresee. 
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Yet if one analyzes the Famine’s origins and pre–autumn 1932 developments on 
a pan-Soviet level, it seems arduous to claim that famine was the conscious goal 
of those policies, as it is maintained by those who support the hypothesis that 
famine was willfully implemented to break the peasant resistance or to execute a 
Moscow- (sometimes meaning Russian-) planned Ukrainian genocide. 
However, the intensity, course, and consequences of the phenomenon, which 
new studies and new documents allow us to analyze, were undeniably and substan-
tially different in different regions and republics. Out of the six to seven million 
victims (demographers now impute to 1930–1931 part of the deaths previously 
imputed to 1932–1933), 3.5 to 3.8 million died in Ukraine; 1.3 to 1.5 million 
in Kazakhstan (where deaths reached their peak in relation to the population 
size, exterminating 33 to 38 percent of the Kazakhs and 8 to 9 percent of the 
Europeans); and several hundred thousand in Northern Caucasus and, on a lesser 
scale, in the Volga, where the most harshly hit area coincided with the German 
autonomous republic.13
If we consider annual mortality rates per thousand inhabitants in the country-
side, and make 1926 equal to 100, we see them jump in 1933 to 188.1 in the entire 
USSR, 138.2 in the Russian republic (which then still included both Kazakhstan 
and Northern Caucasus), and 367.7—that is, almost triple—in Ukraine. Here 
life expectancy at birth dropped from 42.9 years for men and 46.3 for women 
registered in 1926 to, respectively, 7.3 and 10.9 in 1933 (it would be 13.6 and 36.3 
in 1941). Also, in Ukraine there were 782,000 births in 1932 and 470,000 in 1933, 
compared with an average of 1.153 million per year in the period from 1926 to 
1929.14 The extreme figures for Ukraine are explained by the Famine’s different 
course there, for which different Moscow policies were largely responsible. 
In Ukraine, as elsewhere, in the spring of 1932 local officials, village teachers, 
and republican leaders noted the spreading of hunger and the beginning of a mass 
rural exodus.15 Stalin, urged by the Ukrainian party, which asked for a reduction 
in procurements, acknowledged in early June that this was indeed necessary, at 
least in the most hard-hit areas, also out of a “sense of justice.” Such reductions, 
however, had to be moderate and local, because, despite Viacheslav Molotov’s 
report that “today we have to face, even in grain-producing areas, the specter of 
famine,” the Politburo concluded that “procurement plans must be respected at 
all cost.”16 This conclusion was dictated by the need to avoid the repetition, on a 
larger scale, of that spring’s urban food riots and strikes and to honor the German 
bills due between the end of the year and the beginning of 1933.
Already in June, however, Stalin was developing what Terry Martin has called a 
“national interpretation” of the Famine, well before Ukrainian nationalists outside 
the USSR even started to think about it.17 At the beginning, he ranted in private 
against the republic leaders, whom he held responsible for failing to deal with 
the situation with the necessary firmness. Between July and August, however, 
 THE SOVIET FAMINES AND THE UKRAINIAN HOLODOMOR 7
after a Ukrainian party conference had implicitly disagreed with Moscow and on 
the basis of OGPU reports that accused local communists of being infected with 
nationalism, Stalin produced a new analysis of the situation and its causes.18 
What was perhaps the last recorded disagreement with Stalin in a Politburo 
meeting also possibly played a role. On 2 August 1932 someone, probably Hry-
horii Petrovs'kyi (then the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee [VUTsVK] 
chairman), objected to Stalin’s draft of what was to become on 7 August the 
draconian law on the defense of state property against peasant theft.19 A bit later, 
on 11 August, in spite of the recent signing of the Polish-Soviet non-aggression 
pact,20 in a crucial letter to Lazar' Kaganovich, Stalin wrote that Ukraine was now 
the main issue (his emphasis), that the republic’s party, state, and even political 
police organs teemed with nationalist agents and Polish spies, and that there 
was a real risk of “losing Ukraine,” which should instead be transformed into a 
Bolshevik fortress.21 
Such an interpretation, developed on the basis of the Ukrainian experience, was 
later extended by Stalin to the Cossacks (who had been singled out as enemies of 
the regime already in 1919 when they were hit by decossackization),22 the Volga 
Germans, and, albeit in less stark terms, Belarusians. The crisis thus spurred Stalin 
to apply his by then well-developed model of preventive, category-based, and 
therefore collective repression (which had reached its first peak with dekulakiza-
tion) to a number of national and social-national groups that in his judgment posed 
a threat to the regime. As events were to prove, however, Ukraine and Ukrainians 
remained foremost in his mind. 
When, as it was to be expected, procurements proved unsatisfactory throughout 
the grain-producing lands, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Pavel Postyshev were sent 
to Ukraine, Northern Caucasus, and the Volga to redress the situation. The decision 
to use the famine, thus enormously and artificially strengthening it, in order to 
impart a lesson to peasants who refused the new serfdom23 was thus taken in the 
fall of 1932, when the crisis caused by the first five-year plan peaked and Stalin’s 
wife committed suicide. The punishment was tragically simple: he who does not 
work—that is, does not accept the kolkhoz system—will not eat. Stalin hinted 
at such a policy in his famous 1933 correspondence with Mikhail Sholokhov. 
The Don’s “esteemed grain-growers,” on whose behalf the writer pleaded, had 
waged—Stalin wrote—a “‘secret’ war against Soviet power, a war in which”—he 
added, reversing roles—“they used hunger as a weapon,” and of which they were 
now bearing the consequences; that is, implicitly, famine.24 
Most of the stricken areas were not extended any help until the spring of 
1933 (Don peasants got something only in May). Moreover, while Commis-
sar of Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov officially denied the Famine’s existence 
in his answers to foreign officials’ queries, the state “ferociously fought” (in 
Kaganovich’s words) to fulfil these areas’ procurement plans.
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In those places where the “peasant question” was complicated—that is, 
strengthened and thus made more dangerous by the national one (let us remember 
that Stalin explicitly linked the two questions in his writings on nationalism, and 
that the Soviet leadership had seen this hypothesis confirmed by the Ukrainian 
countryside’s great social and national revolts of 1919, repeated, albeit on a 
lesser scale, in early 1930)25—the resort to hunger was more ruthless and the 
lesson much harsher. According to demographic data, in Ukraine, too, mortality 
depended on residency, urban or rural, and not on nationality, meaning that people 
living in the countryside suffered independently of their ethnic background. Yet 
one cannot forget that, as everybody knew, in spite of the previous urbanization-
cum-Ukrainization, villages remained overwhelmingly Ukrainian, while cities had 
largely preserved their “alien” (Russian, Jewish, Polish) character.26 In Ukraine, 
therefore, the countryside was indeed targeted to break the peasants, but with the 
full awareness that the village represented the nation’s spine.
The fact that, because of the “national interpretation,” the decision to use 
the Famine took on very specific traits in Ukraine and Kuban is confirmed by 
measures that were, at least in part, very different from those taken on a pan-Soviet 
scale, with the partial exception of the Don Cossack lands. On 18 November 1932, 
the Ukrainian Central Committee, which Molotov and Kaganovich had crushed 
into submission, ordered peasants to return the meager grain advances over the 
new crop that they had received in recompense for their work. The decision (one 
may imagine what its implementation meant) opened the way for the repression 
of local officials who had helped out starving peasant families by distributing 
grain to them. Hundreds of such officials were shot and thousands arrested, often 
on the charge of “populism.” Meanwhile, in Ukraine and Kuban the state resorted 
to fines in kind in order to also seize meat and potatoes from peasants, a measure 
which was not extended to the Volga, where—with the possible exception of the 
German autonomous republic—Postyshev dealt less harshly with local cadres 
(although less severe punishment did not prevent mass hunger-related deaths). 
Specific areas of Northern Caucasus and Ukraine, where the opposition to col-
lectivization had been stronger, were punished even more cruelly: all goods, 
including non-agricultural, were removed from stores and all inhabitants were 
deported from certain localities. 
Famine thus took on forms and dimensions much bigger than it would have if 
nature had followed its course. It was less intense, in terms of both drought and 
the area it affected, than the 1921–1922 Famine (the 1932 crop, though quite low, 
was still higher than the 1945 crop, when there were no comparable mass hunger-
related deaths), yet it caused three to four times as many victims—essentially 
because of political decisions that aimed at saving the regime from the crisis to 
which its very policies had led and at assuring the victory of the “great offensive” 
launched four years previously.
The awareness that in Ukraine and Kuban the peasant question also was a 
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national question determined the need to deal with and “solve” these questions 
together. In order to make sure that such a “solution” was there to stay, it was 
complemented by the decision to get rid of the national elites and their policies, 
which were suspected, as we know, of abetting peasants. 
On 14 and 15 December 1932, the Politburo passed two secret decrees that 
reversed, but only in the Ukrainian case, the official nationality policies decided 
upon in 1923. According to these decrees korenizatsiia, as it had been implemented 
in Ukraine and Kuban, had spurred nationalistic feelings rather than checking 
them, and produced enemies with a party membership ticket in their pocket. 
Peasants were not the sole culprits of the crisis, but shared responsibility with 
the Ukrainian political and cultural classes. 
On these premises, Ukrainization programs in the Russian republic were abol-
ished. Several million Ukrainians who, following the pro-Russian border choices 
of the mid-1920s, were living in the RSFSR thus lost those education, press, 
and self-government rights that other nationalities continued to enjoy. The 1937 
census would reveal that only 3 million RSFSR citizens defined themselves as 
Ukrainians versus the 7.8 million of 1926 (at least part of this decline was caused 
by the promotion of Kazakhstan, previously a RSFSR autonomous republic, into 
a Soviet one).
A few days later, on 19 December, similar though less harsh measures hit 
Belarus too, where—as in Ukraine—the peasant and the national questions largely 
coincided, a fact that had also caused problems during the civil war, albeit not on 
the Ukrainian scale. Here, too, in early March the party was accused of abetting 
nationalism, and party cadres and the national intelligentsiia were repressed for 
such crimes. The fundamental difference in Soviet nationality policies, which 
were much more tolerant in the east and the north of the USSR than in the west, 
was thus reaffirmed, although there was no reversal of “Belarusization.”27
On the night of 20 December, at the urging of Kaganovich, the Ukrainian 
Politburo committed itself to new targets for grain requisitions. Nine days later it 
declared that the precondition to fulfilling the plan was the seizure of seed stock 
reserves.28 On 22 January 1933, soon after Postyshev, Moscow’s new plenipo-
tentiary in Ukraine, arrived with hundreds of central cadres, Stalin and Molotov 
ordered the OGPU to stop peasants from fleeing Ukraine and Kuban in search of 
food. The Central Committee and the government, they wrote, “are convinced 
that this exodus, like that of the previous year, has been organized by enemies of 
Soviet power, Socialist Revolutionaries and Polish agents, in order to agitate by 
‘using peasants’ against kolkhozes and, more generally, against Soviet power in the 
USSR’s northern territories. Last year party, government, and police organs failed 
to uncover this counterrevolutionary plot…A repetition of such a mistake this 
year would be intolerable.”29 In the following month, the decree led to the arrest 
of 220,000 people, predominantly hungry peasants in search of food; 190,000 of 
them were sent back to their villages to starve. 
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Ukrainian cities too, which were far better, albeit still miserably, supplied, 
were surrounded by antipeasant roadblocks, while villages were left to starve.30 
What the Ukrainian party secretary, Stanislav Kosior, wrote Moscow on 15 March 
confirms that the hunger was used to teach peasants subservience to the state. 
“The unsatisfactory course of sowing in many areas,” he lamented, “shows that 
famine hasn’t still taught reason to many kolkhozniks” (emphasis mine).31 These 
measures were accompanied, and followed, by a wave of anti-Ukrainian terror, 
which already presented some of the traits that were later to characterize the 
1937–1938 “mass operations.” Thus ended the national-communist experiment 
born of the civil war, with the suicide in 1933 of important leaders such as Mykola 
Skrypnyk and writers such as Mykola Khvyl'ovyi as well as the repression of 
thousands of its cadres.
The adoption of the term Holodomor seems therefore legitimate, as well as nec-
essary, to mark a distinction between the pan-Soviet phenomenon of 1931–1933 
and the Ukrainian Famine after the summer of 1932. In spite of their undeniable 
close relationship, the two are in fact profoundly different. The same applies 
to the Famines’ consequences, which also were partially similar yet essentially 
different. Whereas throughout the USSR the use of hunger broke peasant resis-
tance;32 guaranteed the victory of a dictator whom people feared in a new way and 
around whom a new cult, based on fear, started to develop; opened the door to the 
1937–1938 terror; marked a qualitative change in the lie that had accompanied 
the Soviet regime since its inception; allowed, by means of the subjugation of the 
most important republic, the de facto transformation of the Soviet federal state 
into a despotic empire; and left a dreadful legacy of grief in a multitude of families 
that were prevented from dealing with it (Gorbachev too lost three paternal uncles 
then) because of the Famine taboo and the dogma about life having become “more 
joyous”—in Ukraine and in Kazakhstan famine dug even deeper. 
In Kazakhstan, the traditional society’s very structures were seriously impaired. 
In Ukraine, both the body and the top of national society were badly damaged, 
slowing down and distorting nation building. I think, for instance, that only thus 
can we account for the much weaker presence, as compared to what happened in 
1914–1922, of the Ukrainian national movement in the great crisis of 1941–1945 
(Galicia, which in 1933 was not part of the USSR, was not surprisingly the rather 
extraordinary exception). 
The number of victims makes the Soviet 1931–1933 famines into a set of 
phenomena that, in the framework of European history, can be compared only to 
later Nazi crimes. The course of events in Ukraine and Northern Caucasus, and 
the link this course had to both Stalin’s interpretation of the crisis and the policies 
that originated from this interpretation, reintroduce, in a new way, the question 
of its nature. Was there also a Ukrainian genocide? 
The answer seems to be no if one thinks of a famine conceived by the regime, 
or— this being even more untenable—by Russia, to destroy the Ukrainian people. 
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It is equally no if one adopts a restrictive definition of genocide as the planned 
will to exterminate all the members of a religious or ethnic group, in which case 
only the Holocaust would qualify. 
In 1948, however, even the rather strict UN definition of genocide listed among 
possible genocidal acts, side by side with “killing members of the group, and 
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,” “deliberately 
inflicting on members of the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part” (emphasis mine). Not long before, 
Raphael Lemkin, the inventor of the term, had noted that, “generally speaking, 
genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation…It 
is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the 
destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups.”33
Based on Lemkin’s definition—if one thinks of the substantial difference in 
mortality rates in different republics; adds to the millions of Ukrainian victims, 
including the ones from Kuban, the millions of Ukrainians forcibly Russified after 
December 1932, as well as the scores of thousands of peasants who met a similar 
fate after evading the police roadblocks and taking refuge in the Russian republic; 
keeps in mind that one is therefore dealing with the loss of approximately 20 to 
30 percent of the Ukrainian ethnic population; remembers that such a loss was 
caused by the decision, unquestionably a subjective act, to use the Famine in an 
anti-Ukrainian sense on the basis of the “national interpretation” Stalin developed 
in the second half of 1932; reckons that without such a decision the death count 
would have been at the most in the hundreds of thousands (that is, less than in 
1921–1922); and finally, if one adds to all of the above the destruction of large 
part of the republic’s Ukrainian political and cultural elite, from village teachers to 
national leaders—I believe that the answer to our question, “Was the Holodomor 
a genocide?” cannot but be positive. 
Between the end of 1932 and the summer of 1933: 
1. Stalin and the regime he controlled and coerced (but certainly not Russia 
or the Russians, who suffered from famine too, even though on a lesser 
scale) consciously executed, as part of a drive directed at breaking the 
peasantry, an anti-Ukrainian policy aimed at mass extermination and causing 
a genocide in the above-mentioned interpretation of the term, a genocide 
whose physical and psychological scars are still visible today.34
2. This genocide was the product of a famine that was not willfully caused 
with such aim in mind, but was willfully maneuvered towards this end once 
it came about as the unanticipated result of the regime policies (it seems 
that the even more terrible Kazakh tragedy was “only” the undesired, if 
foreseeable, outcome of denomadization and colonial indifference towards 
the natives’ fate).35
3. It took place within a context that saw Stalin punishing with hunger, and 
12 GRAZIOSI
applying terror to, a number of national and ethnosocial groups he felt to 
be actually or potentially dangerous.36 As all the quantitative data indicate, 
however, the scale of both punishment and terror reached extreme dimen-
sions in Ukraine for the reasons I listed, thus growing into a qualitatively 
different phenomenon. 
4. From this perspective, the relationship between the Holodomor and the 
other tragic punishments by repression of 1932–1933 do in a way recall the 
already-mentioned relationship between Nazi repressions and the Holocaust. 
The Holodomor, however, was much different from the Holocaust. It did 
not aim at exterminating the whole nation, it did not kill people directly, 
and it was motivated and constructed theoretically and politically—might 
one say “rationally”?—rather than ethnically or racially. This different 
motivation at least partially accounts for the first two differences.37
5. From this perspective, the Holocaust is exceptional because it represents the 
purest, and therefore qualitatively different, genocide imaginable. It thus 
belongs in another category. Yet at the same time it represents the apex of 
a multilayered pyramid, whose steps are represented by other tragedies, 
and to whose top the Holodomor is close. 
Were it true, as I believe it to be, this affirmative answer has great moral and 
intellectual consequences upon our image and interpretation of the European 
twentieth century. In an essay published in Harvard Ukrainian Studies, after 
discussing the problems related to the “Great Famine’s” medium- and long-term 
impact on Soviet history, I tried to address some of these consequences and would 
now like to recall three of them.38
How does the awareness of the Famines’ modalities, entity, and responsibilities 
affect the judgment we are called upon to pass, as human beings first but also as 
historians, on the Soviet system and its first generation of leaders, a group that 
must be extended to cover the functionaries who executed their decisions, without 
of course forgetting the many who bravely refused to participate in or boycotted 
the state’s policies and were punished for it? In the light of 1932–1933, doesn’t 
that system much more resemble, for at least a stage in its history, a violent 
and primitive state headed by a wicked despot than a modernizing “totalitarian-
ism,” ideologically aimed at conquering and recasting the consciousness of its 
subjects?
Is it possible to maintain that if at the root of the Soviet system, as recast by 
Stalin, there was such a crime, then its collapse is somehow related to this original 
sin, a sin covered for decades by lies because it could not be acknowledged? From 
this angle, the “Great Famine” assumes the features of a formidable obstacle 
to the survival by renewal of a system that could not speak the truth about its 
past and was thus swept away by the surfacing of this truth, often by virtue of 
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people who wanted to reform it and make it more humane, and started to do so 
by settling accounts with the past, only to discover that such accounts could not 
be settled.39
We thus enter the extremely interesting question of the evolution of “totali-
tarianism,” a category I do not like in part because it makes it difficult to account 
for such evolution, which in the Soviet case is nonetheless undeniable. Jacob 
Burckhardt wrote, “even a state founded at the beginning only upon the curses 
of the oppressed is forced with time to evolve some kind of law and civil life, 
because rightful and civil people slowly gain control over it.”40 Can it be that 
if peace prevails for a long enough period, at least the progress, if not the final 
triumph, of such evolution is indeed possible, even when that state’s history is 
marked by genocide? Were it so, Soviet history would be not just the astonish-
ing moral parable that indeed it is, but also the harbinger of hope in much more 
general terms.
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